File:THE HEALTH OF THE U.S. NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE (IA thehealthoftheus1094564892).pdf

Using the knowledge that the naval shipbuilding industrial base has gone through multiple stages of consolidation since 1945, this thesis explores what causal factors have caused weaknesses in the industrial base. And, why has the naval shipbuilding industrial base consolidated since 1945? To answer these questions, this thesis tested the hypotheses that boom-and-bust cycle of military spending, congressional distribution, and preferences for fixed-price contracts cause shipbuilding company failure. The resulting findings suggest that the boom-and-bust cycle of military spending plays the largest role in company failure; however, this hypothesis was not able to explain all cases of consolidation. Congressional distribution theory and preferences for fixed-price contracts also have a hand in company failure. The causal factors that were studied in this thesis were not able to explain all cases of failure, which indicates additional internal and external factors also play a role in naval shipbuilding industrial base consolidation since the end of World War II. These findings have broad implications for the Navy, Congress, and the Executive Branch with regard to maintaining and strengthening the naval shipbuilding industrial base of the future.

Subjects: naval industrial base; boom and bust; shipbuilding; Navy; sequestration; defense spending; procurement; acquisitions; shipyard; defense budget