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• Wikipedia:User:Asarlaí/Germanic and Latinate equivalents in English

Ancient, paganism, folklore

• Ancient Celtic religion - sacrificial shafts etc.
• Celtic deities - Gaulish names; Germanic equivalents
• Aes Sí
• Druids - appearance, practices
• Fionn, Fianna
• Celtic influences on Tolkien
• Christianization of saints and feasts
• Wren Day

Ancient sites

• Slieve na Calliagh
• Brú na Bóinne
• Newgrange - quartz
• Lia Fáil
• Navan - name
• Oppida

Celtic Britons

Pagan Britain p182-184 = votive offerings in rivers, lakes and wetlands, usually of metalwork, eg Llyn Cerrig Bach and Flag Feb p188-190 =votive offerings in pits and shafts, foundation sacrifices of whole domestic animals Roman writer Tacitus said the Britons practiced human sacrifice, while Dio Cassius said it was a component in Boudica's rebellion. This may have been an effort to justify the conquest. p212 = hillforts were enclosures where people gathered seasonally for ritual purposes p216 = Tacitus and Cassius Dio said the Britons worshipped in sacred groves p224-225 = Britons were polytheistic, practised animal sacrifice, believed in an afterlife

Solstice, Christmas

The Oxford Handbook of Christmas pp.4–5 The History of Religions hypothesis was first developed substantially by Usener (1889) and adopted by many scholars thereafter, most notably Botte (1932). The Calculations hypothesis was first developed by Duchesne (1889). pp.7–10 The earliest evidence for Christ's birth being celebrated on 25 December is the Chronograph of 354 CE ... liturgical scholars generally agree that this was originally compiled in 336 CE. Proponents of the History of Religions hypothesis based their case on two main points: Dec 25 had been the Roman date of the winter solstice, and Aurelian had revived the cult of Sol Invictus ('the invincible sun') in 274 and created an annual festival, Dies Natalis Solis Invicti (birthday of the invincible sun) on Dec 25, the winter solstice. Roll, Toward the Origins of Christmas p.87 Tertullian (died circa 225) dates Jesus's death to 25 March. Hippolytus (c. 203-204) dates the first day of creation and Jesus's death to 25 March. Sextus Julius Africanus (c.221) dates the first day of creation to 22 March, Jesus's conception to 25 March. De solstitia et aequinoctia, dated to the "second half of the fourth century", dates Jesus's conception and death to 25 March. pages missing: 96-97, 103-104 p.105 Calculations hypothesis raises more questions than it answers Were ordinary Christians in the third and fourth centuries much interested in calculations with symbolic num- bers in fantasy - combinations ? p.107-108 Proponents of the hypothesis note that: the date of Christmas and the Dies Natalis Solis Invicti were the same, 25 December, the winter solstice; Christmas emerged as a feast during the peak of state-sponsored sun worship; and the many instances of sun-analogies with Christ by Christian writers of the time. p.141 Botte's criticism Rituals in Early Christianity: New Perspectives on Tradition and Transformation p.43 Is it plausible that the introduction of feasts occurred on the basis of calculations by exegetes and theologians? For a feast to take root in a community more is needed than a sophisticated computation. Hijmans, Sol: The sun in the art and religions of Rome. Chapter 9: Aurelian, Constantine, and Sol in Late Antiquity. p.584 It was only in the 330s, apparently, that December 25th was first promoted as a feast day celebrating the birthday of Christ. Initially, this happened only in Rome, but in the 380s it is attested as such in Asia Minor as well Wallraff, who directed the project that recently produced the first critical edition of all preserved fragments of the corpus of Julius Africanus (Wallraff 2007), has kindly informed me that he does not know of any such calculation by Africanus. p.585 According to the famous Calendar of 354, 30 chariot races were held on this day to celebrate the Natalis Invicti. the idea that December 25 was chosen as Christ’s birthday to counteract this important pagan festival has received wide acceptance. The Old English Metrical Calendar (Menologium) p.106 þæt ys on Lyden solstitium and on Englisc midsumor (Byrench ii.1.320–1) 'that is in Latin solstitium and in English midsumor'.

Brú na Bóinne

Wren Day

Hunting the Wren: Transformation of Bird to Symbol In regions where Wren Day was traditional, the wren was regarded with deep reverence and harming it was considered taboo for most of the year. However, on Wren Day the taboo was "replaced by highly complex rituals that grew out of ancient beliefs and involved the ceremonial death and display of the wren". p.46 The typical time for the wren hunt in the British Isles was St Stephen's Day. Wren hunts also took place on Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, New Year's Day and Twelfth Day. Typically, a group of boys and men went out armed with sticks, beating the hedges and bushes, and when a wren flew out they would hunt it down by throwing objects at it. Whoever killed the wren was believed to have good luck all year. The dead wren was then carried in procession through the neighborhood on top of a pole decked with greenery, before being buried. p.47-48 The typical wren hunt occurred in Ireland, the Isle of Man, Wales, England and France, "areas where Celtic tradition was firmly entrenched". Although there is some regional variation, the basic pattern of the ritual is the same wherever it occurred. p.60 By the early 20th century, industrialization and changing beliefs had begun to erode the tradition. But "In some areas, including parts of rural Ireland, the wren hunt was practiced largely in its traditional form until the mid-twentieth century". Since then it has been more common to use fake wrens or stuffed wrens. p.63 Isle of Man, pp.48-49 In 1731, George Waldron gave an account, saying it took place on Christmas Eve. He said that "they go to hunt the wren, and after having found one of these poor birds, they kill her, and lay her on a bier with the utmost solemnity, bringing her to the parish church, and burying her with a whimsical kind of solemnity, singing dirges over her in the Manx language". Other accounts place the wren hunt on Stephen's Day, and "there is a general feeling that Waldron may have been mistaken about the date". The true Manx tradition is to hang the wren's body inside a frame of two wreaths of holly or ivy, known as the "Wren Bush", which was fixed to the top of a pole. One account says the wren was "fixed upon the top of a long pole to which is suspended a red handkerchief, by way of a banner, and in that manner it is carried around the town in triumph". Or the wren was "afixed to a pole with wings outstretched". The Manx "wrenboys", singing "Hunt the Wren", carried this door-to-door asking for money. "When a coin was given, the donor received a feather plucked from the wren". Each feather was kept or worn as a protective amulet against evil and witchcraft. At the end of the day, a funeral was held for the featherless wren. Douglas reports that the Manx church were hostile to the ceremony, but knew they could not prevent it. She wrote that when the group arrived at the church with the sacrificed wren, the vicar "took good care to absent himself from the proceedings, for they were frowned upon by the church at that time as being Pagan and superstitious". p.52 In parts of Mann and Wales, the dead wren was placed in a small wooden box with windows, called the "Wren House", decorated with greenery and ribbons. It was carried aloft on poles by "wren bearers". In other areas, the wren was fastened to the top of a pole with its wings spread, held aloft in a procession during which marchers beat drums and carried colored banners. p.53 Traditionally, the wren boys sung and danced in a ring around the wren bush after the wren was buried by torchlight on St Stephen's Night. The dance is called Helg yn Dreean. Today this is performed as a dance-game by boys and girls. p.78 Origins St Stephen had a pet wren that was stoned along with him. [p.100] Rationalized as a memorial of the Massacre of the Holy Innocents. [p.100] the notion that blood must be shed around midwinter was widely accepted, and the slaughter "undoubtedly had sacrificial implications". [p.100] the Manx fairy woman lured the men into the sea where they drowned. One day a knight found a way of averting her charms. But before she could be destroyed she transformed into a wren and flew away. A spell was cast upon her that she becomes a wren every new years' day. [p.103-104] The ceremony undoubtedly originated from "a very primitive paganism" (Gaster 1964) [p.108] Stewart 1977 suggests that it comes from "a very ancient cult indeed". [p.108] The custom of hunting and killing the wren is undoubtedly related to practices of animal sacrifice of pre-Christian origin. [p.117] The ritual can be "tentatively traced back to Neolithic times" (Whitlock 1979) The Folklore of Birds In these ceremonies the wren nearly always figured as a form of tribute. The Abbey of St. Germain des Pres at Naintre preserves a document of 1663 in which the prior undertakes to give thirty pots of wine each year to the “bacheliers,” provided that they bring him a living wren (Pourveu que les dits bacheliers apportent au dit prieur le roy Bertault en vye). It is stipulated that unless the wren has nine feathers in its tail the prior owes the young people nothing. Also the prior undertakes to pay a certain sum of money if a wren is brought to him at Christmas or New Year’s Day. [p.146] The priory of Chateau-Ponsac in Creuse required a wren, captured by an unarmed hunting party, to be produced as tribute on New Year’s Day. The captor became King of the Fete. He used to go in procession with fife and drum accompaniment to the church, and during High Mass present the bird to the prior, the young people affirming at the same time that they had obtained the wren by legitimate hunting methods and not by means of a gun or a bow and arrow. [p.146] As with the explanations given for eating goose at Michaelmas, so with the accounts concerning the origin of wren ritual — their multi¬ plicity and inconsistency show that we are dealing with very ancient ceremonial the origin of which has been forgotten. It is said that a wren, hopping on a drum, awakened the Danes and so prevented the Irish from surprising them, and that King William’s army was about to be attacked when a wren awakened a drummer by hopping on his drum and so enabled him to sound the call to arms in time. Another version is that wrens alarmed Cromwell’s forces when the Irish were stealthily advancing on them. Yet another explanation is that when St. Stephen was making his escape, a wren alighted on his gaoler’s face and awakened him. [p.160] We find the wren on bad terms with an Irish saint in the legend of St. Moling, which provides the earliest literary refer¬ ence to the Wren Hunt and yet another explanation of its origin. The saint cursed the wren because it ate his pet fly: “He that marred for me the poor pet that used to be making music for me, let his dwelling be for ever in empty houses, with a wet drip therein continually. And let children and young persons be destroying him.” [p.160] In Irish hagiology the wren is referred to as magus avium and in Cormac’s Glossary it is described as a Druid bird which makes predictions. Details of the oracles drawn from the behaviour of the wren have survived. Writers refer to the bird as having been “domestic¬ ated,” but it is not tameable in this sense, though perhaps it was kept for periods in a cage for magico-religious reasons as geese were kept in enclosures by the Britons of Caesar’s time. The appearance of the wren in the folktales of Celtic regions supports the one-time importance of the bird in ancient belief. The story of “The Wren and the Stonechat” is known only from Ireland and Gaelic-speaking Scotland. [p.161] it is a natural inference that the Hunt, taking place, as it does, about the winter solstice, belongs to the great category of rites which have as their object the banishment of evil influences at a seasonal crisis. ... But there is no definite evidence that the wren was ever a scapegoat in the Old Testament sense of a sin-bearer driven from the community, nor treated as were the two sparrows offered according to Mosaic law by a cleansed leper (Lev. xiv.4). However, there is much to suggest that the Wren Hunt was sacrificial. The bird was reverenced but killed at one season only, the feathers were regarded as talismans, the body was sometimes buried with respect, the chief human actor was regarded as in some sense a king, and the bird itself was given a royal title. We may conclude that the Wren Cult reached the British Isles during the Bronze Age and was carried by megalith builders [p.166] British Folk Customs - Page 112 These tales ... are mere rationalizations of a ritual that appears to be older than Christianity, and probably originally from ancient notions connected with the periodic sacrifice of the divine king.

Witchcraft

Willis, Deborah, Malevolent Nurture: Witch-Hunting and Maternal Power in Early Modern England Some women undoubtedly were innocent scapegoats or, at worst, difficult and quarrelsome neighbors. Others may have self-consciously practiced a transgressive but primarily 'white' magic. Still others may have genuinely intended to harm or kill neighbors or authorities by magical means. p.23 Magical healers: Villagers who accepted magic and reformers who opposed it found a common enemy in the witch. p.24 Such magical practitioners ... were normally contrasted with the witch who practised maleficium - that is, magic used for harmful ends. ... Though some more puritan members of the clergy condemned their magic as vigorously as they did witchcraft, in the formative years of the witch-hunts the cunning folk were widely tolerated by church, state and general populace. p27-28 Women were actively involved in making witchcraft accusations against their female neighbors. Macfarlane finds that as many women as men informed against witches ... The number of witchcraft quarrels that began between women may actually have been higher; in some cases, it appears that the husband as 'head of household' came forward to make statements on behalf of his wife. p.35-36 today the magical practices of modern feminist and New Age witches closely resemble those of early modern cunning folk ... Yet the gender ideology, assumptions about nature, and highly psychologized system of beliefs which inform the discourse of present-day feminist or New Age witches would be quite alien to the sixteenth-century cunning woman, whose magical beliefs coexisted comfortably with her Christian ones. p.24 Levack, Brian et al, The Oxford Handbook of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe and Colonial America There was no one stereotype of the European witch, and even within specific localities witches did not conform to a single social profile. There was broad agreement that witches were individuals who could cause harm, misfortune, or evil by some sort of preternatural or occult means... [but goes on to mention 'white witches'] p.3 Trials: The research has resulted in a broad agreement that approximately 100,000 individuals in Europe and colonial America were prosecuted for witchcraft between 1400 and 1775, and that the number of executions did not greatly exceed 50,000. ... as many as 75 per cent of witches who were prosecuted in some jurisdictions escaped with their lives. p.5-6 Accusations: Witchcraft accusations usually came 'from below', i.e. they originated in charges made by the accused witch's neighbours. (paraphrased) ... The illiterate, for the most part, thought of witches as evil people who caused misfortunes by magical means, whereas educated elites, especially those trained in theology and law, were more concerned with the demonic, and therefore religious, dimension of the witches' crime. p.7-8 Magical healers: [In early modern Europe] popular magical traditions played a substantial role in most people's lives. In many places they played at least a great a role as formal Christianity, although most of these traditions were at least superficially Christianized. ... Within this magical universe, witchcraft, the ability of certain people to cause harm through occult channels, was just one of many perceived sources of supernatural danger. p52 Witches were often thought to be able to change into animals, or to use small animals to spy and carry out attacks ... to cause harm by hiding cursed objects on their target's property ... More directly, they were thought to inflict harm via curses, gestures, the evil eye, breath, physical contact, or poisons. p.54 Bad luck and accidents were sometimes blamed on witches, but by far the most common form of injury was illness or death suffered by adults, their children, or their domestic animals. Certain ailments, like impotence in men, infertility in women, and lack of milk in cows, were particularly associated with witchcraft. ... Witchcraft was particularly likely to be suspected when a disease came on unusually swiftly, lingered unusually long, could not be diagnosed clearly, or presented some other unusual symptoms. p.55 Sabbath stories, p.84-100 Ancient Rome: "witches were dreaded in the Greek and Roman worlds" p.123 Hutton, The Witch Around the world, it is believed that witches can either cause supernatural harm because of something innate, or they do so by using magical materials (tools/materials/substances). "The two often overlap, in that a person who is empowered by an innate and internal force can utilize arcane forces in material objects in order to put their powers into action". Often these two kinds of witches exist in the imagination of the same social group. p.18 Most cultures that have believed in witchcraft believe it to be controllable. Some peoples in Africa and Melanesia believed witchcraft was the result of a physical affliction, sometimes hereditary; a virus or substance in the body. Others that it was caused by an evil spirit inside them that drove them to do witchcraft. p.19-20 A common belief throughout the world is that witches use something from their victim's body—hair, nail clippings, clothing, excrement—to work magic against them. They are also believed to use parts of certain plants and animals. Another widespread belief is that witches cause harm by introducing cursed magical objects into their victim's body, such as bones, quills or ashes. p.20-21 Witches are believed to work in secret, violating "common human notions of courage, sociability and justice"... In some aspects, witchcraft "has embodied all that is selfish, vindictive and antisocial within human nature, epitomizing treachery and disharmony". p.22 "Across most of the world, witches have been thought to gather at night, when normal humans are inactive, and also at their most vulnerable in sleep". p.22 Across most of the world, witches are thought to reverse social norms by engaging in cannibalism, incest and nudity. In some regions they are believed to use parts of corpses and to kill babies. p.22 Night witch/night demoness: Some societies in different parts of the world have held two concurrent concepts of the witch; one taking the form of a theoretical being, which operates by night and performs effectively superhuman feats, and one representing genuine human beings who are suspected and accused of witchcraft in day-to-day life. p.67 Ancient Rome, p.59-66: The laws of the Twelve Tables, from the early republic, forbade the luring away the profit of crops from someone else's land to one's own, but did not specify that the means was by magic. It also outlawed 'evil song', which could signify a magical incantation. The Lex Cornelia (Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis) of 81 BC forbade killing by veneficium, which could mean both poison and magic, although ancient people would not have been able to distinguish between the two. By the third century AD, the Lex Cornelia was extended to cover the making of love potions, the enactment of rites to enchant, bind or restrain, the possession of books containing magical recipes, and the 'arts of magic' in general. To practise magical rites incurred the death penalty, with those who offered them for money being burnt alive. In 331 BC, an epidemic hit Rome, with high mortality, and over 170 female citizens were put to death for causing it with veneficium. In 184-180 BC, an epidemic hit Italy, and much bigger trials for veneficium were held, resulting in 2,000 executions during the first wave and over 3,000 in the second wave. If the reports are accurate, "then the republican Romans hunted witches on a scale unknown anywhere else in the ancient world". During the Imperial era, individuals were prosecuted for magic, whether or not it harmed anyone. Ancient Roman literature from the first century BC onward features witch characters: women who work powerful evil magic, "using disgusting materials and rites and invoking underworld and nocturnal deities and spirits". They include Lucan's Erichtho, Horace's Canidia, Ovid's Dipsas, and Apuleius's Meroe. They are typically hags who chant incantations; who make potions and poisons from herbs and the body parts of animals and humans; sacrifice children; control the natural world; raise the dead; transform themselves and others into animals; invoke underworld deities and spirits. Dickie, Magic and Magicians in the Greco-Roman World, p.138-142 According to Pliny, the Twelve Tables laid down penalties for using incantations to charm someone else's crops into one's own possession, and forbade the uttering of harmful incantations. The only recorded trial involving this law was that of Gaius Furius Chresimus in 191 BC. He was acquitted of using spells to entice the fruits of others into his plot. "The clause forbidding evil incantations does not forbid incantations per se, but only incantations taking the form of song intended to harm". In the early Roman Empire (from 27 BC onward) "some aspects of magic-working were subject to legal action". Modestinus, a Roman jurist of the early third century AD, wrote that sacrifices performed for evil purposes were subject to punishment under the Lex Cornelia. The Pauli sententiae, from the same century, says the Lex Cornelia imposes a penalty on those who perform sacrifices at night to bewitch someone. It also describes penalties for giving potions to induce an abortion or to induce love. The magicians involved were to be burned alive. "Magicians who were part of the household of rich and powerful men and women were to be found not only in Rome, but also in the eastern provinces of the Empire". p.212 "Most people will have had to look elsewhere for help in magic-working. Where they looked is the question. The obvious answer would seem to be that they consulted their local magician. Since magicians were periodically expelled from Rome, it looks as though there were magicians who were more or less permanently domiciled in the capital. It is hard to believe that the same did not hold true for Carthage or Antioch or Alexandria or even Athens ... The magician about whom our sources for the period do tell us is the itinerant sorcerer". p.216 "the wandering magicians who put on shows of thaumaturgy [wonderworking] in the marketplace or at the crossroads also advertised their expertise in other more private and personal forms of magic". p.231 "in the Hellenistic Greek world and in Rome certain areas of magic were the peculiar preserve of women, and old women especially. These are not the more spectacular forms of magic-working, but the run-of-the-mill cures and snake-charmings" p.237 "The earliest recorded Christian legislation dealing with magic or soothsaying belongs to the year AD 319 and to the reign of Constantine the Great. ... A few years later Constantine felt it necessary to define what forms of magic should be punished and what should go unpunished: those who with the help of the magical arts either attempted to harm the well-being of other men or to seduce chaste minds into succumbing to lust were to be punished under the most severe laws; no criminal prosecutions were to arise out of the use of devices employed to protect human bodies or when devices were employed in the countryside to protect the grape-harvest ... for Constantine the forms of activity that he excludes from criminal prosecution are also magic, but differ from the preceding category in that they are aimed at preserving human beings and their crops from harm". p.243 Rives, Magic in Roman Law: The Reconstruction of a Crime (journal article) "I argue that the Roman law on magic grounded in the Lex Cornelia gradually shifted from a focus on harmful and uncanny actions to a concern with religious deviance". p.313 Venenum denoted "any natural substance that had an occult or uncanny power to affect something else" ... "it would be better to describe the law on veneficium as dealing not with both magic and poisoning, but rather with wrongful death effected through occult and uncanny means". p.320

Gaelic gods

Characteristics (Carey, John, "Tuath Dé", in Celtic Culture: A Historical Encyclopedia, pp.1693-1697) They are described in idealized terms, beautiful and immune to age or sickness. The powers most often attributed to the Tuath Dé are control over the weather and the ability to shapeshift themselves and other things. In some texts they are said to control the fertility of the land; the text De gabáil in t-sída says the first Gaels had to establish friendship with the Tuath Dé before they could raise crops and herds. They dwell in the Otherworld, which is described as either a parallel world or a heavenly land beyond the sea or under the earth's surface. They are associated with specific places, especially the sídhe mounds. This recalls the "profusion of dedications to local deities among the Continental Celts". They appear to humans only when they wish to. In several tales, a king's right to sovereignty is confirmed by an encounter with a supernatural female. It has been argued that Irish inauguration ceremonies originally represented a ritual marriage with the goddess of the land (see sovereignty goddess). In other tales, a king receives affirmation of his legitimacy from one of the Tuath Dé (such as in the tale Baile in Scáil). The Tuath Dé can also bring doom to unrightful kings. Divinity (Carey, John, "Tuath Dé", in Celtic Culture: A Historical Encyclopedia, pp.1693-1697) Medieval writers explained them as fallen angels; neutral angels who sided neither with God nor Lucifer and were punished only by being forced to dwell on Earth; or as humans who had become skilled in magic. It is not clear whether the Tuath Dé represent the gods of Irish paganism, but the hypothesis is strong. The name itself means "tribe of gods". Goibniu, Luchta and Creidne are called the trí dé dáno (three gods of skill). The 9th-century Scél Tuain meic Cairill (the tale of Tuan Mac Cairell) speaks of the settlement of Ireland by the Tuath Dé ocus Andé (tribe of gods and un-gods). It says the learned "think it likely that they belong to the exiles who came from heaven". This shows the keen desire of the Irish literati to find a place for the old gods within a Christian worldview. Cormac's Glossary calls Anu "mother of the Irish gods", Brigit a "goddess worshipped by poets", and Nét a god of war. The Dagda's name means "the good god" or "the great god". Goibniu, Dian Cécht the physician, and Flidais the mistress of animals are invoked in incantations, which is further evidence that they were seen as supernatural powers. Lugh is cognate with the god Lugus, Brigit with the goddess Brigantia, Nuada with the god Nodons, Ogma with the god Ogmios. Writing in the 7th century, Tírechán explained the síd folk as 'earthly gods' (Latin dei terreni). Fiacc's Hymn says the Irish "adored the síde" before the coming of Patrick. However, it is not wholly accurate to describe them all as gods in the medieval literature itself, as it was written by Christians. The Tuath Dé are sui generis. A more neutral term would be "immortals". Fomoire (Carey, John, "Fomoiri", in Celtic Culture: A Historical Encyclopedia, p.762) A race of hostile supernatural beings, often described as monstrous in appearance. In one of the earliest reference to them, a probably 7th-century elegy for Mess-Telmann, they are said to dwell "under the worlds of men". They are the enemies of Ireland's first settlers and of the Tuath Dé, with whom they are contrasted. However, in some sources there is an overlap between the Fomoire and Tuath Dé. A figure called Tethra is named as presiding over both races. Ireland's Immortals, A History of the Gods of Irish Myth pp6, 14 There is evidence that the ancient Irish and Britons set up anthropomorphic wooden and stone idols of gods. Patrick wrote that the Irish had "idols". p10 Rivers were venerated as divinities, usually goddesses. p15 If Anglo-Saxon England is anything to go by, after the rulers of a population converted, the public worship of pagan gods probably took about fifty years to disappear. As Ireland had many territories, this process was probably repeated many times. p29 An Irish deity probably had to have some political, ideological or geographical importance (or be associated with an important people) to survive in some way after their cult had ended. A single deity could splinter into several medieval characters. pp38-43 Tirechan 'deorum terrenorum' (gods of the earth); sídh-folk as elves p171 In the Lebor Bretnach the name plebes deorum (god-folk) is given as the Latin form of Tuatha De Danann. p187 Adding the name Donand onto tuath dé seems to have been partly a way of humanizing them: instead of 'god-peoples' they were now the 'peoples of the deity Donand'. Myth, Legend & Romance: An encyclopaedia of the Irish folk tradition pp244-245 A large number of characters have "vestiges of divine attributes", but not many personages are overtly divine. Almost all of the literature was written by Christians, who took an approach to the lore which suited Christian beliefs. A common theme in Irish mythology is the symbolic unity of a king with an otherworld lady. Such ladies are a metaphor for the land. The three Milesian leaders gain the kingship of Ireland by an agreement with the three Tuath Dé ladies Eire, Banba and Fodla, each being a name for the country itself. In Baile in Scail describes a vision of Eriu as 'the sovereignty of Ireland', giving a drink to each successive king. The land goddess represents the land in bad times and good, thus she can appear as an ugly hag or beautiful maiden. The tale of Macha shows how a king disrespecting the land goddess can bring disaster for the kingdom. The land goddess could also take the form of a war-goddess as an extension of her role into protector of her territory. This is most clearly expressed in accounts of the Morrigan. pp312-315 (Mythological Cycle) "Many of the characters are Irish manifestations of a Celtic pantheon of divine beings". The conflict between the divine Tuath De and the demonic Fomoire is an Irish version of the war between two supernatural groups, found in other Indo-European mythologies, such as between the Aesir and Vanir in Norse, the Asuras and Devas in Vedic, and the Olympians and Titans in Greek. The gaining of agricultural knowledge from the Fomoire paralells a similar theme in the Norse and Vedic versions, where the defeated races represent the fertility of the soil. pp407-409 Their name means 'people of the goddess Danu'; often referred to by the shorter form Tuatha Dé. They were associated with the various ancient burial mounds and megalithic tombs such as passage tombs. The Gaels must have associated them with an ancient supernatural race. Feth fiada

Medieval

• Gaelic Ireland - fianna, mythology, detail from Medieval Ireland Encyclopedia
• Celtic Britons - paganism, Welsh mythology, interactions with Anglo-Saxons
• Germanic peoples - Teutonic
• Earldom of Ulster
• Hugh Roe O'Donnell
• Gallowglass
• Gallarus Oratory
• Wikipedia:St Patrick's Cathedral, Armagh (Church of Ireland) - Reformation
• Corleck Head, Tandragee Idol
• Aticotti
• Witchcraft

Places, placenames

Commons:Wiki Loves Earth 2023 in Ireland Commons:Wiki Loves Monuments 2023 in Ireland

• Townland
• Towns and villages in Ireland - alternative/colonial names

Irish mountains ()

• Knocknashee
• Paps of Anu
• Slieve Donard - cable car
• Twelve Bens
• Scottish island names
• Celtic placenames

Scottish Gaelic placenames (lochs, glens, islands, Pictish names) ({{lang-gd|'''O'''}})<ref name="ainmean">{{cite web|url=https://www.ainmean-aite.scot/placename/ |title= |work=[[Ainmean-Àite na h-Alba]]: Gaelic Place-Names of Scotland}}</ref>
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({{langnf||Scottish Gaelic|}})

<ref>{{cite web |last1=Mac an Tàilleir |first1=Iain |title=Ainmean-Àite/Placenames |url=http://archive2021.parliament.scot/Gaelic/placenamesA-B.pdf |publisher=[[Scottish Parliament]] |page=1 |date=2003}}</ref>

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Ireland placenames

Aghabullogue Anglesboro Ardfield - Ardofoyle Arthurstown - Coleman Ashbourne - Frederick Bourne - Killeglan Ashford - Ballymacahara Athleague Bagenalstown - Lord Walter Bagenal - Muine Bheag Bailieborough - William Bailie - Killycolly/Killycollie Ballindooley - Ballindooly [official] Ballineen and Enniskean Ballybrophy - Ballybrohy Ballyheigue - Ballyheige [official] Barefield - Gortlumman [alternative] Batterstown - Rathregan Bellewstown Bettystown-Mornington - Inver Colp Binghamstown - Geata Mór [official] Birdhill - Knockaneeneen Bishopstown - Ballinaspig Blennerville - Sir Rowland Blennerhassett - Cahermoraun Blessington - Ballycomeen Boolavogue - Boolavoge Booterstown - Ballyboother Boston Buttevant - Killnamullagh Cadamstown - Ballymacadam Calverstown - Ballincallow Canningstown - George Canning - ? Carrigtwohill - Carrigtohill [official] Causeway - Kantogher Celbridge - Kildroght/Kildrout Chapeltown, Kerry Charleville - Ráth Luirc/Rathcogan Cheekpoint Cherrywood Churchill - Minalaban Churchtown, Co Cork - Bruhenny Cleariestown Clifden Cloughduv - Cloghduff [official] Cloughjordan - Cloghjordan [official] Clounanaha - Cloonanaha [official] Coachford - Magourney Colehill - Knocknagole Collinstown, Westmeath Courtown Craanford Cranford Crookstown, Cork Crookstown, Kildare Crosshaven Drimoleague Duncormick - Duncormac [alternative] Edgeworthstown - Mostrim [alternative] Emyvale - Scarnageeragh Enfield Eyrecourt - Donanaghta Flagmount Foulkesmill - Mullinfooky Fountainstown - Ballymontane Foxford Foxrock Frenchpark - Dungar Freshford Garristown Glounthaune Goatstown Goresbridge - Ralph Gore, 1st Earl of Ross Graiguenamanagh - Graignamanagh [alternative] Hacketstown - Ballydrohid Headford Herbertstown Hollyford - Bellacullin Horseleap - Athnurcher/Ballanurcher Hollymount Hollywood, Wicklow Holycross Horse and Jockey Hospital Hugginstown - Ballyhuggin Islandeady - Illaneedan Jamestown, Co Leitrim - King James I Johnstown, Co Kilkenny - Coorthafooka Julianstown Kilmacanogue - Kilmacanoge [official] Killinaspick Kilmuckridge - Kilmocrish Kingscourt - Dunaree Lanesborough-Ballyleague Lawrencetown, Co Galway - Oghilmore Laytown - Ninch Littleton - Ballybeg Longood, Meath - Moydervy Loughlinstown - Ballyloughnan/Ballylaghnan Loughmore - Loughmoe [official] Louisburgh - Clooncarrabaun Manorhamilton - Sir Frederick Hamilton - Clonmullan Marlfield Mayfield, Cork - Ballinamought Midfield - Treanlaur Midleton

Hebrides island names

[1] "Scandinavian Naming-Systems in the Hebrides Arran - from Gaelic arann (kidney-shaped/ridge) or Brittonic aran (high place) Baleshare - from Gaelic Baile Sear (east townland) Barra - Norse name Barrey = from Gaelic barr (top, summit, head) or Norse barr (scrub) Berneray (several) - from Norse *Bjarnarey (Bjorn's isle) Boreray - from Norse *Borgarey (fort isle) Bute - Gaelic name Bót, Norse name Bót Canna Coll - Hiberno-Latin name Colosus Colonsay - from Norse *Kolbeinsey (Kolbeinn's isle) Danna - from Norse *Daney (Dane isle) Eigg - from Gaelic eag (notch) Eriskay and Eriska - from Norse *Eiríksey (Erik's isle) Erraid - from Gaelic Fladday and Flodday (several) - from Norse *Flatey (flat isle) Fuday - from Norse *Búðey (abode/resting place) Gigha and Gighay - from Norse Guðey (good isle/God isle) Gometra - from Norse *Guðmundarey (Godmund's isle) Harris - Ancient name Adru?/Erimon? Holy Island - Gaelic name Eilean MoLaise, Norse name Malasey Iona Islay - Ancient name Ili, Norse name Íl Jura - from Norse *Djúrey (stag island) Kerrera - from Norse Kjarbarey Kintyre - from Gaelic ceann tíre (headland/peninsula), Norse name Saltíri, Satíri, Santíri Lewis - Ancient name Limnu?, Norse name Ljoðahús Lunga/Longa/Longay - from Norse Langey (long isle) Muck - from Gaelic muc (pig) Mull - Ancient name Malaios, Norse name Mýl Oronsay/OrasayOrnsay - from Norse *Örfirisey (tidal island) Rona - Norse name Rauney Rum Sanday (several) - Norse name/origin Sandey (sandy isle) Scalpay - from Norse *Skalpey (skalpr meaning sword-scabbard or whetstone) Seil Skye - Ancient name Scetis, Norse name Skíð Soa/Soay (several) - from Norse *Sauðey (sheep isle) Texa - Old Gaelic name Oidech Tiree - Hiberno-Latin name Terra Ethica, Old Gaelic name Tír Iath, Norse name Tyrvist Uist - Norse name Ívist Ulva - from Norse *Ulfey (wolf isle) Vatersay - Viay and Wiay (several) - from Norse *Búey (settlement)

Ukraine

• Disinformation - [2], [3], [4]
• War crimes
• Attacks on civilians
• Attacks in Russia
• Attacks in Crimea
• Wikipedia:Israel–Ukraine relations

• https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2024/1120/1481913-undersea-cables-data-internet-ireland-europe-sabotage-military-attacks/
• https://www.thejournal.ie/nato-cables-general-wiermann-6094957-Jun2023/
• https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-41517743.html
  • Russian ships have been monitored by the Irish Air Corps and naval service off the Irish coast.
  • believes Russia has mapped undersea communications and electricity cables and pipelines off the coast of Ireland.
  • About 75% of all undersea communications cables in the Northern Hemisphere pass through or near Irish waters. Ireland is home to a large number of data centres that handle the majority of transatlantic data traffic. These cables are potential military targets for Russia.

Negotiations

https://ecfr.eu/article/the-us-election-ukraine-and-the-meaning-of-peace/ The official line is that any settlement that did not restore Ukraine’s 1991 borders would be unjust and a gross violation of the international order. Russian annexation of Crimea - the international community de facto accepted in the vain hope that Russia would be satisfied. “Land for peace” didn’t work, so why should “peace for land”? Ukraine’s society rejects a “peace for land” settlement. 77 per cent would find negotiations based on the current territorial status quo unacceptable. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine Persistent calls for a ceasefire or ‘negotiated settlement’ to end the fighting without tackling its underlying cause – Russia’s ambition to eliminate Ukraine as we know it – will do no more than reward the aggressor while punishing the victim. The unanimous conclusion of the authors is that the only outcome to the war that can safeguard the future security of Europe is a convincing Ukrainian victory – hence, Western military support to Kyiv should be redoubled before it is too late. Ukraine still needs a massive influx of weaponry. Without it, Ukraine will cease to exist as a sovereign state and an emboldened Russia will continue its imperialist campaign of expansionism against neighbours and aggression against perceived adversaries, democratic and otherwise, the world over. In the longer term, backing Ukraine will serve to deter other aggressors while potentially sowing the seeds for positive political change in Russia. At one end of the scale are the demands of the Ukrainian government. These include the withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, the full restoration of Ukrainian territory, justice for war crimes, and reparations for war-related damages. At the other end of the scale are calls for Ukrainian compromise and concession. The gist of these positions is that Ukraine is unlikely to be able to liberate its sovereign territory from Russian occupation, much less achieve justice through international courts – and that therefore, since the current bloodshed is futile, the sooner Kyiv is induced to accept a negotiated settlement and territorial losses, the better. Where the cost of leaving Ukrainian citizens under Russian occupation is recognized, it is presented as a lesser evil than fighting on to liberate them. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-1-settle-now-all-wars-end-negotiating-table settlement on any of Russia’s terms makes little sense for two principal reasons. First, it has been decisively rejected by Ukraine itself. President Zelenskyy’s government and the Ukrainian people remain unequivocally committed to decisive victory, and are lobbying hard for the West to supply more military equipment and related assistance. In this, Ukraine has the especially strong support of other front-line states neighbouring Russia, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. These states recognize clearly both the necessity of deterring and punishing, rather than tolerating, aggression and the vicious nature of the regime imposed on a previously free people. Second, the argument for Ukrainian concessions – in effect, surrender – risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. In other words, there is no surer way of arriving at a dangerous and unsustainable outcome than not sending weapons to Ukraine. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-2-ukraine-should-concede-territory-exchange-peace Any territorial concessions by Ukraine in a peace agreement with Russia will reward crimes and aggression. They will encourage, not end, Russia’s attacks on countries in its neighbourhood and elsewhere in Europe. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-3-ukraine-should-adopt-neutrality Calls for Ukraine to become ‘neutral’ because this will remove Russia’s incentive for aggression ignore the fact that Ukraine was already neutral when first attacked in 2014. Implementation of such proposals would expose Ukraine to future attacks that would threaten European security still further. ... Imposed neutrality would leave Ukraine exposed to a continued existential threat. It would invite more aggression from Russia and is contrary to a fundamental principle of international law – the sovereign right to choose international alliances. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-7-costing-too-much-and-west-needs-restore-economic-ties The financial costs of pushing back against Russian aggression in Ukraine are high, but entirely manageable given the size of Western economies. Failure to act would leave Europe at risk of further Russian expansion, attack and economic blackmail, ultimately costing the West much more over the long term. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine/fallacy-9-war-not-our-fight-and-there-are-more-important-global Allowing Russia to remain in control of any Ukrainian territory could lead to further land grabs by Moscow, just as allowing the annexation of Czechoslovakian territory in 1938 did not halt Hitler’s Lebensraum campaign. https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/global-perspectives-ending-russia-ukraine-war If there was a ceasefire now with no Russian withdrawal ... The result would be a frozen conflict, in which the parties would continue to pursue their original objectives—for Ukraine, liberation; for Russia, conquest—with different tactics. Russia would likely resort to subterfuge, provocation, intimidation, and influence operations meant to hamper Ukraine’s economic reconstruction and political democratization ... In the end, violence, even large-scale violence, would most likely flare up again. Daniel Szeligowski: Putin will get no rest until he either subjugates Ukraine or destroys it. This imperial self-conception is not just his, but that of Russian elites at large. What happens in Ukraine will not stay in Ukraine. Daniel Szeligowski: the war will drag on until the West eventually steps in and fully embraces Ukraine. Therefore, the shortest path to ending this war runs through Ukraine’s accession to NATO, which would be the least costly, and, simultaneously, most effective. ... An accession to NATO would likely entail a painful delay for Kyiv in regaining some of the occupied territories, which Article 5 would temporarily not cover—the ultimate price to be paid for our foot-dragging in arming Ukraine. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/19/ukraine-russia-war-stalemate-victory-congress-military-aid/ The defeat of a Western-backed country would embolden Russia and other revisionist states to change other borders by force. torture, disappearances, and arbitrary detention Political indoctrination and the militarization of youth are already key characteristics of life under Russian occupation. New children’s textbooks expunge Ukrainian history and preach hatred for Ukraine’s leadership. The Ukrainian language is being removed from much of the education system. Should Ukraine lose, almost all of Ukrainian society would need to be punished, repressed, silenced, or reeducated if the occupation is to quell resistance and absorb the country into Russia. For this reason, a Russian takeover would be accompanied by mass arrests, long-term detentions, mass deportations into the Russian heartland, filtration camps on a vast scale, and political terror. If a serious insurgency emerges, the level of repression will only widen and deepen. Libraries and schools will be purged of all such subversive content—in essence, the majority of all writing and cultural output that Ukraine has produced during the last three decades. Russian territorial advances would be accompanied by a second wave of Ukrainian refugees far more massive than that of early 2022. For the remaining Ukrainians, the future would be one of totalitarian controls on culture, education, and speech, accompanied by a mass terror on a scale not seen in Europe since the 20th-century era of totalitarian rule. https://cepa.org/article/russian-victory-would-bring-darkness-to-the-heart-of-europe/ They will be held hostage, forced from their homes, their ideas and hopes suppressed, and subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, and murder. Can the West really be certain that a country using these kinds of tactics will be satisfied with its victory, or should it look again at the detailed demands Putin made in December 2021 and recognize that he has far darker ambitions? What would a Russian victory mean for the world? Another territory controlled by Moscow where anyone who resists is held in pre-detention centers and prisons or brainwashed by the propaganda machine. More people to fight against NATO soldiers, some willingly, and others conscripted into the Russian army by force. A stalemate or victory in Ukraine would also encourage the Kremlin to seek wars in Georgia and Moldova. But Vladimir Putin will not limit himself to these countries. As he seeks to restore the Russian empire, he would shift his attention to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and potentially even Finland. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/what-ukraines-defeat-would-mean-us-europe-and-world Putin does not hide his genocidal intentions to destroy Ukraine as an independent state and Ukrainians as a separate people. The continuation of the war is necessary to achieve these goals, as it allows not only the physical destruction of those Ukrainians who are ready to offer armed resistance (so-called ‘demilitarisation’ in the terms of the Kremlin's ‘special military operation’), but also the creation of conditions incompatible with normal life for millions of civilians – both in the occupied territories and in other areas – forcing them to leave Ukraine and seek refuge in other countries (so-called ‘denazification’, which is essentially nothing more than ethnic cleansing). a defeat would be perceived as a military one, where the West – led by the US – did not have sufficient military means to support the operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. it would encourage countries such as China, Iran and North Korea to continue their own military expansion The destruction of Ukraine, which in 1993 gave up the world's third-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons after receiving security guarantees from Russia, the US and the UK, would be an absolute argument in favour of the idea that the only means of protection against aggression by nuclear states is the possession of nuclear weapons of one’s own. ... More and more non-nuclear countries would seek to acquire their own nuclear weapons. there is no alternative to defeating Russia in Ukraine. Any attempt to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, according to which Ukraine could survive in some form despite the loss of territory and sovereignty, would just be another Minsk Agreement – namely, giving Putin the strategic pause necessary to prepare the next phase of aggression. There is no way to force Putin to follow through on such a deal. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-would-trump-and-harris-handle-the-russia-ukraine-war/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/05/ukraine-change-compromise-russia/678312/

NATO

Mearsheimer, "The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War", June 2022 speech said there is no evidence that Putin wants to conquer Ukraine believes Putin has been telling the truth ... "he does not have a history of lying to other leaders ... or foreign audiences" "He has never once hinted that he wants to make Ukraine part of Russia. If this behavior is all part of a giant deception campaign, it would be without precedent in recorded history." "there were only 190,000 soldiers in Russia’s invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine" "there is no evidence Russia was preparing a puppet government for Ukraine" Cirincione, Joe. "What’s Missing from Mearsheimer’s Analysis of the Ukraine War", July 2022 On Ukraine, however, he is dangerously wrong. The key driver of NATO expansion was one that I underestimated and that Mearsheimer specifically ignores: Eastern Europeans wanted protection from a historic foe. They pushed to join NATO; America did not pull them into an anti-Russian pact. Mearsheimer’s assurances today that Putin has only “limited aims” and that his February blitzkrieg failed not because of fierce Ukrainian resistance but because the “Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine” are as wrong now as they were in 2014. Then, too, he predicted that after seizing Crimea, Putin had no further territorial ambitions. But Russia itself provides the rebuttal. In late July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said outright that Moscow’s goal was to free Ukraine’s people from the “unacceptable regime” in Kyiv. On June 9, Putin gave a speech on the war where he did not say one word about NATO or NATO enlargement but did wax eloquent about his similarity to Tsar Peter the Great and returning Russian land. the second variable Mearsheimer ignores in his construct: Putin has long feared that popular resistance to his increasingly authoritarian rule at home would spread if Ukraine and other ex-Soviet republics grew too close to the West. ... Former Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer also agrees, and lists domestic politics as the second most important motivation for Putin after Russian geopolitics. “For the Kremlin, a democratic, Western-oriented, economically successful Ukraine poses a nightmare,” he wrote this July, “because that Ukraine would cause Russians to question why they cannot have the same political voice and democratic rights that Ukrainians do.” the greatest flaw in Mearsheimer’s argument: In order to make his case, he must minimize Russian atrocities. ... To make current facts fit his past analysis, he must rationalize if not excuse Russian behavior as an understandable reaction Koselka, Filip. "John Mearsheimer’s lecture on Ukraine: Why he is wrong and what are the consequences", July 2022. By publicly defending his scientifically unsound thesis, Mearsheimer legitimises Russia’s propaganda and violates the fundamental values of social responsibility that all academics should respect. Mearsheimer’s main point is that the United States and its allies are to blame for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since they allegedly pushed for Ukraine’s NATO membership, the prospect of which Russia has seen as an existential threat. First, it ignores the fact that Ukrainians – like other Eastern Europeans – have been actively seeking NATO membership to protect themselves from the Russian threat. They did not need to be pushed, they have desperately wanted to join. Ukraine joining NATO would hardly be a credible military threat to Russia and, if Crimea remained in Russian hands, Russia’s key strategic interests would be largely preserved. All this suggests that any serious explanation of the invasion needs to consider additional factors such as Russia’s domestic political situation; the ideological and symbolic threat a democratic and prosperous Ukraine would represent to Russia’s incumbent political regime; and the potential desire of an ageing dictator to conquer immortality through territorial expansion. one would hope that such a controversial thesis would be borne out by strong empirical evidence. Yet, the evidence presented during the lecture largely boils down to an uncritical reading of selective official statements made by the Russian leadership. Why should one believe what Russia’s leaders say? “Because Putin rarely lies to foreign audiences”, claimed Mearsheimer. ... During his talk, Mearsheimer thus remained oblivious to Russia’s numerous lies on public record, including Putin’s original denial of any involvement in Crimea in 2014, which was followed by open boasting about the annexation a few months later. Mearsheimer’s lack of critical scrutiny of Russia’s statements contrasts with his refusal to consider that Russia could have imperial ambitions and that the invasion’s objective could (also) be territorial. ... Putin has been quite clear in his repeated pre-invasion statements, denying the legitimacy and even the very existence of the independent Ukrainian state. Mearsheimer's claim about Russia's too-small army: Russia clearly targeted Kiev from the first day of the invasion and that it suffered terrible military losses arguably due to poor intelligence. All available evidence points to a disastrous miscalculation by the Kremlin leadership consisting, among others, in a serious over-estimation of the effectiveness of its own army, and of the popular support for Russia within Ukraine. Russian may have assembled fewer troops than would be normally necessary for controlling a country the size of Ukraine because it expected little resistance. McFaul and Person, War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World, 2024 if Putin really believed NATO to be a military threat, he would not have suggested Russia strengthen ties with NATO in the early 2000s. In 2002, he said that Ukraine's relations with NATO were "a matter for those two partners". This Russia-NATO cooperation during its eastward enlargement highlight the flaw in the argument that NATO enlargement caused the conflict. Mearsheimer argues that the statement issued at the 2008 Bucharest summit made the conflict inevitable. Yet "If this were true, why would Russia's cooperation with NATO expand in 2010 ... [and] why did it take Russia a full six years to invade Ukraine? Ukraine's parliament only revoked its non-aligned policy in late 2014, after Russia had invaded Crimea and the Donbas. Likewise, in early 2022 there was no imminent "threat" of Ukrainian NATO membership. ... "He did not need to invade Ukraine (again) in 2022 to prevent NATO expansion because NATO expansion was not happening". A more compelling theory is Russian imperialism. Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus, 2017 Mearsheimer argues that Russia acted as it did in February 2014 out of defensiveness and fear. ... Why fears of NATO encroachment in 2008 or EU encroachment in 2014 triggered wars, but did not result in wars in 2004 - when NATO expansion incorporated the former Soviet Baltic republics - needs expanation. (p.32) McFaul and Sestanovich, "Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?", 2014 Back then, Mearsheimer was already worrying about a war betweenRussia and Ukraine, which he said would be "a disaster." But he did not finger U.S. policy as the source of theproblem. "Russia," Mearsheimer wrote, "has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries,and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity." In February 2014, after police killed scores of demonstrators in downtown Kiev, the whole country turnedagainst him, effectively ending his political career. Parliament removed him by a unanimous vote, in which everydeputy of his own party participated. This is not what anyone has ever meant by the word "coup". Yanukovych's fall was a historic event, but it did not, despite Russian claims, revive Ukraine's candidacy for natomembership. Ukrainian politicians and officials said again and again that this issue was not on the agenda. Nor wasthe large Russian naval base in Crimea at risk Mearsheimer, https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is.pdf Hughes, Alex. "Plan Z: Reassessing Security-Based Accounts of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine", Journal of Advanced Military Studies. Strategy scholar Lawrence Freedman writes that "NATO enlargement … features in many explanations for the origins of the war … whether or not we believe that NATO poses an objective threat. … Threats to a state are interpreted by those in charge." He also argues, however, that "the more authoritarian the system, the more the issue becomes one of what makes the supreme leader insecure, which might be anything that threatens their personal position." Non-security accounts of the Russian government's motives generally fall into one of two distinct, albeit compatible, categories. The first posits an ambition on the part of Putin and his inner circle to significantly increase Russia's relative power in international affairs, particularly vis-à-vis the United States, for non-security reasons. In this account, the goal of the invasion was to absorb—outright or de facto—much or all of Ukraine into a rejuvenated Russian Empire or Greater Russia. Jeffrey Mankoff argues that Russia's invasion "may be the 21st century's first imperial war." A September 2022 article by Angela Stent and Fiona Hill, both experienced Russia specialists, argued that "Russia's president invaded Ukraine not because he felt threatened by NATO expansion or by Western 'provocations.' He ordered his 'special military operation' because he believes that it is Russia's divine right to rule Ukraine, to wipe out the country's national identity, and to integrate its people into a Greater Russia." Niall Ferguson wrote that Putin's July 2021 essay "made it perfectly clear that he was contemplating a takeover of the country along the lines of Nazi Germany's 1938 Anschluss of Austria". As former U.S. Russia ambassador Michael A. McFaul puts it, Putin fears "democracy on Russia's border practiced by people with a shared culture and history. If Slavs succeeded in consolidating democracy in Ukraine, Putin's theory about the Slavic need for a strong, autocratic ruler with orthodox conservative values would be weakened." Anne Applebaum makes the same case, writing that Putin "wants Ukrainian democracy to fail." Samuel Ramani, a Russian security policy expert, argues that Putin's "obsessive focus on NATO expansion over the past decade or so" is a "political construct." "The real issue for him," Ramani continues, "is that the West, or liberalism, or foreign values, poses a threat." The Analytical Impasse Debates about the origins of the Russia-Ukraine War are often framed in terms of whether Putin and his inner circle strongly objected to Ukraine joining NATO. But as the previous survey shows, whether he cares about Ukraine's association with NATO, or the extent to which he cares, is not the main issue—rather, the key question is why. A purely security-oriented state might strongly oppose its neighbor's ambition to join an alliance such as NATO because it believes this will jeopardize its security. Conversely, a state that does not envision a significant security cost may also oppose its neighbor's move if it intends to coerce, subjugate, or conquer that neighbor in the future. In each case, the available evidence is more consistent with non-security interpretations of Russian motives, but the security-seeking account becomes especially difficult to defend when these issues are considered in combination. Russia's Nuclear Vulnerability Rationale In How the West Brought War to Ukraine, Benjamin Abelow contends that offensive U.S. missile installations in Europe, both actual and anticipated, also played an important role in Putin's decision. Influential analysts such as Dmitri Trenin have emphasized the same concerns, while Russian officials have repeatedly forwarded them as an implicit rationale for the invasion. First, although Aegis-borne Tomahawks could be mated with nuclear warheads and would be capable of deeply penetrating Russian territory, they are dwarfed in both number and yield by America's current land- and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces, which already render all Russian territory vulnerable. Russia's government should know that the U.S. military could not successfully carry out a disarming first strike.116 For Putin's stated [End Page 188] concerns to be honestly held, he would have to believe that U.S. leaders were either delusional, or might be willing to tolerate the annihilation of most of America's major cities to gain the meager damage limitation benefits associated with striking first in a hypothetical crisis. Moreover, it is far from clear why this concern, if it were honestly held, would lead Putin to initiate a large-scale conventional invasion of Ukraine. Abelow argues that one of Russia's key concerns regarding Ukraine lay in the possibility that U.S. Aegis systems might be deployed on its territory.118 But Abelow rightly notes that intermediate and cruise missiles in Poland and Romania could already reach Moscow and other targets deep inside Russia. The invasion has expended a large proportion of Russia's cruise missile arsenal and blocked resources ... that could have been far more efficiently employed, from a strategic stability standpoint, in upgrading Russia's missile defenses. Moscow's Prewar Diplomacy: Desperation or Diversion? Alongside Mearsheimer, many prominent observers argued that Moscow was making its [pre-war] demands [about NATO] in good faith, in the sense that they accurately reflected its underlying concerns, and that—if met—Putin intended for them to serve as an alternative to a major military operation. However, other commentators convincingly argued that the extent of Russia's demands—and the way they were conveyed—implied that their actual purpose was to buy time and sow doubt as the invasion force assembled. Michael Kofman noted at the time that "Moscow has not only been asking for things that it knows it cannot attain, but it has been doing so in a manner that will ensure that it cannot attain them … By publicizing its demands and refusing to unbundle them in ways that might achieve compromise". Germany's chancellor, Olaf Scholz, has stated that in negotiations prior to the invasion, he told Putin privately that Ukrainian accession to NATO "won't happen in the next 30 years."150 Recounting the "completely absurd" response he received, Scholz said that Putin insisted that both Ukraine and Belarus should not be independent states, and also came away with the sense that Putin does not accept the legitimacy of liberal and open societies in Europe. Russian Warnings on NATO Enlargement These stated concerns might be genuinely held, but could instead serve as a legitimizing pretext and diversion, concealing Putin's underlying nonsecurity goals. The a priori credence with which these remarks should to be treated is widely disputed, including among offensive realists. If Putin was concerned about the security implications of NATO enlargement, he could be expected to have been consistently and unambiguously opposed to closer ties between Ukraine and NATO throughout his presidency... When asked about the future of Russian, Ukrainian, and NATO relations at a 2002 press conference, for example, he responded: "I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day the decision [on NATO membership] is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners." Shortly thereafter, Putin remarked on Ukrainian accession at a press conference with NATO's then secretary general Lord George Robertson, and his words were officially summarized by the Russian government as follows: "On the topic of Ukraine's accession to NATO, the Russian President said that it was entitled to make the decision independently. He does not see it as something that could cloud the relations between Russia and Ukraine." In a 2005 interview...When directly asked whether it "irritate[s] you that NATO is seeking to expand its influence among your neighbours and partners, in Ukraine and Georgia, for example?," he replied that "this does not irritate us ... If other former Soviet republics want to join NATO, our attitude will remain the same. But I want to stress that we will respect their choice because it is their sovereign right to decide their own defence policy and this will not worsen relations between our countries". On the question of Ukraine's entry into the EU, the Russian government quoted Putin in 2004 as outright endorsing the prospect, writing that he "considers that if Ukraine were to join the EU this would be a positive factor that, unlike NATO expansion, would help strengthen the system of international relations." By the time of his famous Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, Putin's stance had shifted significantly, castigating eastward enlargement as a "serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?" However, as Kimberly Marten notes, Putin had been reducing the quantities of troops and hardware deployed along Russia's western borders since entering office and would continue to do so for the next seven years. Tellingly, the former NATO secretary general has said that "in all the meetings and conversations I had with [Putin], he never complained about NATO enlargement, not once. … We had the 2002 enlargement, seven countries joining NATO, all from the Warsaw Pact, including three from the Soviet Union. But not a single time did he complain." This corroborates former U.S. ambassador McFaul's claim that Putin did not mention NATO enlargement a single time to President Barack H. Obama during their phone and in-person communications between 2009 and 2014, all but one of which McFaul was present for. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/ https://www.brookings.edu/articles/russias-draft-agreements-with-nato-and-the-united-states-intended-for-rejection/ https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/one-more-time-it%E2%80%99s-not-about-nato https://www.justsecurity.org/80343/russias-new-assault-on-ukraine-is-not-entirely-maybe-not-even-largely-about-nato/ https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376095810_No_Great_Russia_without_Greater_Russia_The_Kremlin%27s_Thinking_behind_the_Invasion_of_Ukraine https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-russia-vladimir-putin-soviet-union-4619a72d1597673e4112b673a9f6fd9c https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59935990 https://time.com/6137966/russia-military-missiles-ukraine/ https://english.elpais.com/usa/2022-02-02/us-offers-disarmament-measures-to-russia-in-exchange-for-a-deescalation-of-military-threat-in-ukraine.html

Russian imperialism

Russian imperialism Russian irredentism Russian world Ruscism Putinism Russian separatist forces in Ukraine Russian Imperial Movement Nationalist imperialism has become Russia's state ideology under Putin. In June 2023, a trio of enormous flags—each one half the size of a soccer pitch—were hoisted up 175-meter-tall flagpoles on the shore of the Gulf of Finland on the outskirts of St. Petersburg. Waving side by side were the 165-year-old Russian imperial flag in black, yellow, and white; the Soviet Union’s flag featuring a hammer and sickle; and the modern Russian tricolor. Crowning this bizarre display was the tallest skyscraper in Europe, Gazprom’s Lakhta Tower, which is a perfect symbol of the state-capitalist model of Putin’s regime. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-review/article/abs/vladimir-putins-aspiration-to-restore-the-lost-russian-empire/C0099C205BCDBA970CB699AFD534CBE5 I argue that the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, by his political actions in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Central Asian countries, and his current actions in Ukraine, strives to re-establish the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, ignoring the principle of international law that protects the sovereignty of each nation-state over its territory. In order to achieve his goals Putin uses ‘soft force’ and social fermentation in Russian-speaking ‘near abroad’ nation-states of the former Soviet Union. He also uses a policy of weakening the economy of the target countries and uses Russian chauvinism and irredentism as the basis of his policy. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nationalist-and-imperial-thinking-define-putins-vision-russia Nationalist and Imperial Thinking Define Putin's Vision for Russia For Putin, the historic role of Russia in Eurasia and in regathering the Russian communities has been amplified since 2014, interweaving nationalist ideas with a neo-imperial longing. Russia also sought to advance a soft power and cultural influence project that overlapped with the expanded definition of the Russian nation through the idea of the Russian World. These efforts were intended as a means to exert influence and to give substance to the claim of Russia having a special regional role on the basis of its responsibility to the diaspora. During the Russia–Georgia war of 2008, for example, the Russian government claimed that its military actions were justified by the need to protect Russians and Russian citizens in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181 Russia’s political class has an imperial mentality, especially towards smaller neighbouring countries in central Eurasia. According to Marcel van Herpen, author of the provocative Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, this mentality has its roots in the early modern period. ‘For the Russian state,’ he writes, ‘colonizing neighbouring territories and subduing neighbouring people has been a continuous process. It is, one could almost say, part of Russia’s genetic makeup’ (van Herpen, Citation2014, p. 2). This line of thought dovetails with the notion of a Russian Sonderweg propounded by historians such as Pipes (Citation1974) and Szamuely (Citation1974), who argue that Russia’s imperialist essence has remained immutable across the centuries, regardless of the regime in power. Kirchick (Citation2017), who asserts that: "Russia seeks conflict with the West. That is because the Putin regime – nationalist, revisionist, territorially expansionist – cannot coexist alongside a democratic Europe willing to stand up for its principles. Moscow sees liberal democracy as a threat and therefore must defeat it." Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism 3: Under the guise of the Eurasian Customs Union, Eurasian Economic Union and Eurasian Union, new efforts of empire-building have begun. 56: the new Russian imperialism is clearly in the interest of Russia’s ruling political and military elite, whose positions are strengthened and consolidated by a neoimperialist policy 61: Putin has sought to "restore the lost empire". This "neoimperialism" is based on Russian ultranationalism and economic imperialism. 257: In 'The Dawn of Peace in Europe', Michael Mandelbaum wrote "to the extent that the reincorporation of Ukraine was successful, Russia would once again become a multinational empire with a foreign policy of expansion westward, and thus a threat to Europe". Empires of Eurasia: How Imperial Legacies Shape International Security 18: Putin justified the Crimea annexation on the basis of Russia's imperial tie to the region. 25: Concepts like compatriots, a Russian World, or Holy Rus embody the idea of a Russian imperial nation transcending the Russian Federation's borders. All of these concepts challenge neighboring states' efforts to construct their own civic nations and disentangle their histories from Russia. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/11/blood-and-iron-how-nationalist-imperialism-became-russias-state-ideology?lang=en Nationalist imperialism has become Russia's state ideology under Putin. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/vladimir-putin-end-russian-idea https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/the-end-of-the-russian-idea/ Stalinist nationalist imperialism has become the de facto ideology of the Putin regime. Putin has emphasized that the Soviet Union—especially in its triumph over Nazi Germany in World War II, when Stalin appealed to nationalism rather than Marxism to consolidate support and rally the population—carried out Russia’s imperial destiny under a different name. Putin resurrected the Russian imperial idea with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and expanded it with the launch of the “special operation” eight years later. Buttressed by the abstract and archaic teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church, he has also embraced an older strain of nationalist ideology in which the decadent West is the enemy and Russia has a messianic destiny to oppose its harmful influence. What is particularly striking about Putin’s Russia, however, is the extent to which it has combined re-Stalinization with antimodern imperialism. Putin’s ideologues now suggest that Russia can only uphold its status as the defender of civilization by combining a reinvigorated empire with the conservative precepts of the church. https://time.com/6218211/vladimir-putin-russian-tsars-imperialism/ Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine is a sign of the imperial expansionism that has defined the Russian state for so much of its history. But it is based as much on mythical ideas as on geo-politics in the conventional sense: ideas of a nationalist, socially conservative, anti-Western and religious character that underpin dictatorships in Russia, China, and Iran. Before us we can see a new type of empire arising in Eurasia, uniting countries with historic grievances against the West. It is an empire growing in supporters and ideas. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623528.2022.2074947#d1e109 Russia's invasion of Ukraine ... is an imperial war in the world of nation-states, underpinned by Russia’s open denial of Ukraine’s political sovereignty and the Ukrainians’ right to exist as an independent nation. Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire 9: Under Putin, part of Russia's foreign policy has been to "reimperialize" the post-Soviet space. Moscow has sought influence over its "compatriots" by offering them Russian citizenship and passports (passportization), and eventually calling for their military protection. Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival 58: Since his third term, Putin's foreign policy seems to be a revival of Russian imperialism Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17 https://www.kcl.ac.uk/putins-new-new-imperialism-in-the-war-against-ukraine https://www.politico.eu/article/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-has-ripped-facade-off-anti-imperialism/ Russian World https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/06/russia-putin-civilization/ Under the rubric of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), Putin’s government promotes the idea that Russia is not a mere nation-state but a civilization-state that has an important role to play in world history. Included within this civilizational framework are ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in former Soviet republics that extend beyond Russia’s national borders. While the Kremlin refers to the Ukrainian government as “Nazis,” the actual neo-fascist ideologues in this conflict are those in the Russian leadership. In 2001 Putin said “The notion of the Russian World extends far from Russia’s geographical borders and even far from the borders of the Russian ethnicity.” Putin has institutionalized the ideology of Russkiy Mir in Russian government structures. For example, by presidential decree and in cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin established the government-funded Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2007. The foundation’s stated mission is to increase the study and learning of Russian language, culture, and history—but it has largely served as a way to push a Russian-centric agenda in former Soviet states. Mankoff, The War in Ukraine and Eurasia’s New Imperial Moment Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991...Russia has maintained (or secured) defacto control over a range of territories belonging to the internationally recognized territory of other states: Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and of course, Crimea and the “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk (Ukraine). Putin has also established effective political domination over Belarus. In each of these cases, Moscow has claimed it was protecting some mix of Russians, “compatriots (sootechestvenniki),” and members of an amorphous “Russian World (russkiy mir),” whose identity is defined not by their Moldovan, Georgian or Ukrainian citizenship, but by some ineffable historical, cultural, or spiritual tie to Russia. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/18/russia-is-a-distinct-civilization-putin-says-a70295 Russia is a distinct civilization that must be preserved through genetics and other advanced technologies, President Vladimir Putin said in an interview that aired Sunday. ... as well as hypersonic weapons Putin decreed in 2019 that all Russians be assigned “genetic passports” by 2025.

Crimea annexation

https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/RussianInvasionCrimeanPeninsula.pdf Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea, p140 On the night of 26-27 February, Russian special forces without insignia departed Sevastopol... Russia's War Against Ukraine, p2004 Russia's war against Ukraine began with the annexation of Crimea on 27 February 2014. On that day, Russian special forces... Armies of Russia's War in Ukraine, p7 The decision to take seize Crimea appears to have been made on 20 February. Zero hour was set for 27 February. Ukraine and Russia: From civilized divorce to uncivil war, p218 In the early hours of February 27, sixty heavily armed men seized... The Fear Peninsula

Donbas War beginning

Ukraine's Maidan, Russia's War, p.151-153 6 April: oblast admin buildings occupied in Donetsk and Luhansk cities. They proclaimed Pavel Gubarev 'people's governor' of Donetsk and Valeriy Bolotov governor of Luhansk, both Russian citizens. The DPR was proclaimed (the LPR followed two weeks later). 7 April: regional SBU headquarters were stormed and automatic weapons were seized. 12 April: the main administrative building, police station and SBU office in Sloviansk were captured by a unit of heavily armed men. They were 'volunteers' from the Russian Armed Forces under the command of Russian GRU colonel Igor Strelkov. 13 April: Ukraine launched the ATO. Ukraine's Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022 6 April: in Donetsk city, hundreds of masked men seized weapons from the SBU headquarters. They then joined a few thousand pro-Russian protesters and stormed the Donetsk RSA building. They demanded the regional parliament meet at noon the next day and call a referendum on joining Russia. The parliament did not meet, so the activists declared the 'DPR' an independent state. p138-140 6 April: in Luhansk city, hundreds of protesters attacked the SBU headquarters for six hours, demanding the release of anti-Maidan militant held there. They eventually stormed the building, releasing prisoners and seizing weapons. p138-140 12 April: a fifty-man commando unit led by Igor Strelkov occupied Sloviansk, with the help of armed local activists. They came from Crimea, and like in Crimea, they wore no insignia. The Ukrainian govt believed they were being invaded and this was a repeat of Crimea. p147-148

Attacks on civilians

6 July - central Lviv missile strike Aftermath of the Lviv missile strike, 6 July 2023 On 6 July 2023, Russian forces launched ten Kalibr cruise missiles at Lviv, in western Ukraine. One of the guided missiles hit an apartment block in a residential area, killing ten civilians, wounding almost fifty, and causing widespread damage. Most of the other missiles were shot down, but two struck Ukrainian military targets nearby. Human Rights Watch said the attack should be investigated as a war crime. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/19/ukraine-russian-missile-strike-lviv-possible-war-crime

Ukraine photos
File:Z TANK.png

NI and Troubles

• Wikipedia:The Troubles in Northern Ireland (1920–1922)
• Billy Wright, Robin Jackson, Billy Hanna, William James Fulton
• Wikipedia:Timeline of Ulster Volunteer Force actions (Patrick Kelly), Wikipedia:Timeline of Ulster Defence Association actions (2022 Ombudsman reports)
• State papers
• NI Executive and Assembly - length of time suspended
• DUP

The Troubles 1920-1922

Northern offensive Lawlor, The Outrages, pp.285-290 (Battles at Pettigo and Belleek) One of the most vulnerable parts of NI was the area between Belleek and Pettigo, two villages divided by the border. It formed a triangle that was largely cut off from the rest of NI by Lough Erne. National Army troops were deployed to the two villages, and IRA forces had also taken up positions in the area. A USC unit was sent into the triangle by boat and occupied Magherameena Castle on the Northern side. On 27 May, the IRA attacked the USC, forcing them to abandon their position. The IRA also ambushed a USC convoy headed towards Belleek, killing the lead driver and forcing the Specials to retreat. Over the next few days, Specials and British troops attempted to capture Pettigo from a force of about 100 IRA volunteers, by both land and water. British forces eventually captured Pettigo on 4 June after fierce gun battles and bombarding the IRA positions with artillery, then went on to capture Belleek in similar fashion. Lynch, Robert. The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition. p.155-156 On 27 May ... a large party of Specials, numbering around 100,crossed Lough Erne and landed near Belleek. They proceeded to take over Magherameena Castle as their headquarters only to be attacked by a large IRA patrol. The Specials decided to retreat back over Lough Erne eventually landing on Buck Island. The following day a relief column of Specials attempted a rescue but they were ambushed and forced to pull back with one casualty. The Specials then began to move on Pettigo whilst the IRA moved to block all of the bridges crossing from Fermanagh into the salient. The 100-strong IRA garrison in Pettigo were by now virtually surrounded and on Saturday 3 June the final attack came with the British launching a heavy artillery bombardment on the village and a simultaneous assault along the Belleek road. The British use of artillery proved decisive with three IRA men dying in the attack. In purely military terms the Belleek - Pettigo incident was the closest the Northern IRA came to engaging in a pitched battle with regular British soldiers. It was the first time since the summer of 1920 that the British Army had become directly involved in the fighting [in Northern Ireland]. ... it increased tensions between London and Dublin dramatically. Casualties and refugees Lynch, The Partition of Ireland, p99-100 It was the worst violence Belfast had experienced up until then. Belfast suffered a higher per-capita death rate than any other part of Ireland during the period, accounting for 40% of all fatalities in Ireland during the revolutionary period. Deaths: Almost 500 killed in Belfast, about two-thirds Catholics and one-third Protestants. Destruction: Almost 1,000 homes and businesses destroyed in Belfast, about 80% Catholic and 20% Protestant. Refugees: An estimated 10,000 became refugees, most of them Catholics. Workplace expulsions: 8,000–10,000 expelled, mostly Catholics. Catholics: made up a quarter of Belfast's inhabitants, but suffered two-thirds of the casualties and 80% of the property damage. They also bore the brunt of workplace expulsions, with 8,000–10,000 expelled. Protestants: A third of murder victims in Belfast were Protestants, around 1,000 Protestants were forced from their homes, around 2,000 Protestants became refugees, and around 200 Protestant businesses were destroyed. In the north-east, less than 15% of those killed belonged to the IRA or British forces. It was primarily a communal conflict rather than being driven by military or paramilitary groups. p171 At least 10,000 people were forced to move within Belfast alone (8,000 Catholics and 2,000 Protestants). 175-176 Newspaper reports reveal almost 10,000 Northern Catholics in Dublin alone during the spring of 1922.

Other

• Wikipedia:List of Irish-language given names
• Wikipedia:List of High Kings of Ireland, Wikipedia:List of monarchs by nickname
• Wikipedia:Genetic history of the British Isles, Irish people - genes largely unchanged since Bronze Age
• Black British people
• Entheogen - Direct evidence of the use of multiple drugs in Bronze Age Menorca
• Wikipedia:Foreign-language influences in English
• Wikipedia:Imperial units and Wikipedia:United States customary units
• Wikipedia:Daytime running lamp
• Bathory CDs quality
• Trees in Northern Isles and Iceland
• Dublin hotels

The 2012 Gaza War, or Second Gaza War,

British and Irish far-left

https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/i-m-not-the-only-one-by-george-galloway-756576.html To his credit, he opposed Saddam's tyranny in the 1980s when the Americans supported the dictator and his acts of genocide. But - like so much of the Left - when the Americans switched sides, so did he. Hatred of American power appears to be his primary motive, rather than any positive left-wing values of his own.

Demography

Northern Ireland Census 2021 data Census 2021: More from Catholic background in NI than Protestant Population 1,903,175 Ethnicity White 97%, other 3% County of birth NI: 87% England, Scotland, Wales: 4.5% Republic: 2% Other countries: 7% Religion (Main statistics for Northern Ireland: Statistical bulletin - Religion) Catholic (42.3%) Presbyterian (16.6%) Church of Ireland (11.5%) Methodist (2.3%) Other Christian denominations (6.9%) Other religions (1.3%) No religion (17.4%) Combining current religion and religion of upbringing gives 45.7% had a 'Catholic' background 43.5% had a ‘Protestant or Other Christian’ background 1.5% had another religious background 9.3% had no religious upbringing. National identity (Main statistics for Northern Ireland: Statistical bulletin - National identity) The national identity question supported respondents selecting more than one national identity. 42.8% identified solely or along with other national identities as ‘British’. 33.3% identified solely or along with other national identities as ‘Irish’. 31.5% identified solely or along with other national identities as ‘Northern Irish’. ‘British only’ - 31.9% ‘Irish only’ - 29.1% ‘Northern Irish only’ - 19.8% 'British and Northern Irish only' - 8% 'Irish and Northern Irish only - 1.8% Other national identities - 6% Passports (Main statistics for Northern Ireland: Statistical bulletin - Passports held) 52.6% of usual residents held a UK passport as either their sole passport or along with a passport for another country. 32.3% held an Ireland passport either solely or jointly. 3.9% held a European (non-UK/Ireland) passport. 1.6% held passports from other countries in the world.